has spent much time focusing on our acquisition system because we are concerned that the weapons we are buying are taking too long to field and are costing too much. We believe the American people should not pay more than they have to. But we also believe our Armed Forces should get the weapons they need to defend our security. SACS have concluded we need this fighter. We recommended full funding this year for 20. I believe we will do that next year and the year after that until we have procured 183 F-22 fighters. Authorizing a multiyear will cost the American people \$250 million less than if we authorize these fighters year by year. That is good acquisition policy. Our Armed Force needs this fighter, and we should not pay \$250 million more to get it than we have to. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Arizona will yield 1 minute? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 1

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to

put in the RECORD a chart from the In-

stitute for Defense Analysis. It com-

pares savings on various programs,

showing savings with the F/A-18,

multiyear, from 7 to 11 percent; the C-

17 airplane, of 10 percent; the C-130J,

multiyear, of 10 percent; and the com-

parison to the F-22, which they esti-

mate at 2.6 percent. I ask unanimous

consent that this chart be printed in

the RECORD.

TABLE 4.—CHARACTERISTICS OF OTHER RELEVANT MYP PROGRAMS

minute.

Program	Savings (%)	Savings (TY\$M)	Prior lots/ units	Period of perform- ance (years)	Procure- ment timeframe	Quantity procured	Amount of CRI funding (\$M)	Amount of EOQ funding (\$M)	FAR	TINA waiver
F/A-18E/F Air Vehicle (MYP-1) F414 Engine (MYP-1)	7.4 2.8	\$850 51	3/62 5/682	5 5	FY00-04 FY02-06	222 454	\$200 0	\$85 0	15 15	No No
F/A-18E/F/G Air Vehicle (MYP-2) C-17A Airframe (MYP-1)	10.95 5.0	1,052 760	8/284 8/40	5 7	FY05-09 FY97-03	210 80	100 350	300	15 15	Yes No
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100)	6.0 10.8	122 1,211	4/160 14/112	7 5	FY97-03 FY03-07	320 60	0	0 645	12 12	No Yes
C-17A Engine (F117-PW-100) C-130J/KC-130J	5.7 10.9	92 513	14/448 9/37	5 6	FY03-07 FY03-08	267 62	0	0 140	12 12	No No
C-130J (Air Force) KC-130J (Marine Corps)	10.9 13.1	340 173		6	FY03-08 FY03-08	42 20	0	unknown	12 12	No No
F-16A/B/C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-1) F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-2)	7.7 10.1	246 467	4/605 8/1139	4	FY82-85 FY86-89	450 720	unknown unknown	unknown	15	No No
F-16C/D Air Vehicle (MYP-3)	5.7 8.00	262 469	12/1859	4 5.25	FY90-93	630 292	unknown	unknown	15	No
Average F-122A Air Vehicle F-122A Engline (F119-PW-100)	2.6	203	8a122	3.23	FY07-09	60	0	255	15	No
r-122A Engine (r119-rw-100)	2.7	32	8 <sup>6</sup> 244	3	rtu/-09	120	0	45	15	No

a Include Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) lot and units.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. President.

## AMENDMENT NO. 4241

Mr. President, I am a proud cosponsor of Senator McCain's proposal to name this legislation after the great chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner.

I have had the privilege during my term in the Senate to serve on the Armed Services Committee under two tremendous chairmen, outstanding Senators, and terrific human beings—John Warner and Carl Levin.

Our Senate, our military, and our country have been fortunate to have their extraordinary leadership during these critical years.

Chairman Warner, for whom this legislation would be named, is more than deserving of that honor. He is greatly respected by our committee members on both sides of the aisle and, indeed, by the entire Senate. He has been unfailingly fair to all points of view, while leading us with a firm hand and resolute gaze, that he learned during his own military service and as Secretary of the Navy.

When he picks up his committee gavel, all of us—members, staff, military officers, and other interested parties—all know we have a leader well prepared in all respects for that enormous responsibility.

Our Senate and our Nation are indebted to Senator Warner and to Senator Levin for their superb public service.

Mr. President, I have listened to many of my colleagues express their views on Iraq during the past week and have waited for this opportunity to express my own.

My colleagues reflect sincere differences and I believe sincere desires to uphold the best interests of our great country in a very difficult and complicated situation. We are all patriotic Americans first and foremost and partisan politicians later.

I voted against the Iraq war resolution in October 2002, despite being presented with incorrect and misleading information by very high officials in the Bush administration, which purported to prove that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. I questioned the veracity of that information. And I had grave concerns that an unwarranted invasion of Iraq, if no weapons of mass destruction were found, would ultimately weaken, not strengthen, the national security of the United States by seriously damaging our standing and our alliances throughout the world.

I also voted against the Iraq war resolution because I believed that such a decision by the Congress at that time was premature. President Bush was not asking Congress for a declaration of

war, as the U.S. Constitution requires. He was asking for a congressional resolution authorizing him to declare war, if he determined it necessary at some later date. I do not fault the President for asking for that blank check. I fault the Congress for giving it to him. In fact, it was over 6 months later that the President made his final decision to commence military action against Iraq.

In a similar vein, I believe that both the Levin-Reed amendment and the Kerry-Feingold amendment were premature. One called for the redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq to begin within 6 months. The other required the almost complete withdrawal of those troops within a year.

I believe it is impossible to foresee at this time whether either of those actions would be in the best national security and foreign policy interests of the United States 6 months or 1 year from now. The situation in Iraq is too uncertain and too unpredictable to do so. That uncertainty and unpredictability evidence the failures of the Bush administration's conduct of this war effort.

It is now over 3 years since the U.S. military swept from the Iraqi border to Baghdad in only 3 weeks, overthrew Saddam Hussein and his evil regime, and liberated the Iraqi people. Yet after that swift and decisive military victory was won, the Bush administration has failed to secure it.

Administration officials ignored the advice of their own top military commanders—and this is an important lesson for us—and failed to commit

b Include PRTV lot and units and Replacement Test Aircraft (RTA); installed engines only.